Policy synergy between the central government (CG) and local governments (LGs) can effectively reduce overcapacity and promote energy transition. This study investigates the CG-LGs’ policy synergy dilemma and influencing factors in the process of coal de-capacity in China using a two-stage evolutionary game model. The results show that: first, in the policy formulation stage, reducing policy formulation costs and increasing public credit losses can prompt the CG to consider provincial heterogeneity, while reducing policy formulation costs and increasing political gains and administrative penalties can prompt LGs to actively negotiate with the CG to develop policies. Second, in the policy implementation stage, the positive net income of LGs can result in an ideal situation (i.e., the CG chooses the loose supervision strategy, but LGs still adopt the strict enforcement strategy). Reducing implementation costs, enhancing environmental quality, and establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms prompt LGs to implement a de-capacity policy. Third, the CG's strategic choice in the policy formulation stage impacts the evolution of the strategies of the two subjects in the policy implementation stage. The above results promote policy synergy between CG and LGs and provide insights for policymakers for designing an effective coal production capacity governance model.
 

Policy Synergy,Two-Stage Evolutionary Game Method,De-capacity policy,Central government,Local governments